7.      On John Stuart Mill

In his An Introduction to Ethics, William Lillie has summarized Mill’s utilitarianism in the following five statements:

(a) Pleasure is the only thing that is desirable. (b) The only proof that a thing is desirable is the fact that people do actually desire it. (c) Each person’s own pleasure or happiness … is a good to that person, so the general happiness is a good to everybody. (d) Men do desire other objects, but they desire them as a means to pleasure. (e) If one of two pleasures is preferred by those who are competently acquainted with both we are justified in saying that this preferred pleasure is superior in quality to the other.[1]

Lillie then goes on to criticize Mill for confusing the words “visible” and “audible” with “desirable”. “Visible” and “audible” respectively mean “able to be seen” and “able to be heard”, whereas desirable means “ought to be desired”.[2] Put like this, it is certainly a valid point, and this has become a standard criticism of Mill on this issue. However, I think, Lillie has been unfair to Mill; because Mill’s views on ethical method are more profound than Lillie makes them appear.

In the first chapter “General Remarks” of his book Utilitarianism, this is what Mill has to say about ethical method in an important passage. Talking about the proof of utilitarianism or happiness principle, he says:

 “It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof … If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a means, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof”.[3]

In chapter IV, titled “Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible”, too, Mill begins by saying:

“It has already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.”[4]

Then, in the same chapter, he goes on to add:

“The only proof  capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.”[5]

It is obvious that critics like William Lillie have ignored the more important things about ethical method, which Mill has said and pounced upon his clearly wrong analogy of “visible”, “audible” and “desirable”.

To my mind, Mill has made some important points regarding the ethical method or logic of ethics. “Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof”.

Again, “It has already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct”.

Even in Mathematics, one has to begin with axioms, which are self-evident and are accepted as true without any formal proof.[6] In Geometry, for instance, a theorem, say, the tenth theorem can be proved with the help of say the earlier nine theorems, which have already been proved, the ninth theorem with the help of earlier eight and so on, but the process cannot go on indefinitely, we have to stop somewhere. Therefore, first, we have to accept some axioms as our starting point and the first theorem can be proved using the axioms, and, subsequently, other theorems can be proved by using the axioms and the theorem or theorems already proved.

So, if we can have axioms in Mathematics, then why not in Ethics? Besides, the axioms need not be subjective and arbitrary. Some meta-ethical considerations (observations about the nature and role of ethics in human life) can be presented in favor of their acceptance, such as, ethics being a human creation and social need, the fact that ethical rules are framed for human beings, that moral rules exist for human beings and not vice versa, that any sound ethics must take into account the human nature, that ethical ends are human ends and they cannot be independent of  human needs and desires, that all or almost all human beings desire life and satisfaction of desires, that ethical rules must be such that all or most of human beings accept them voluntarily as rational beings, and so on. I dare to suggest that based on such considerations we can accept the following ethical judgment as an axiom in ethics:

 “Happiness or satisfaction of desires is good”.

I think most human beings will accept this axiom unless they are in a frame of mind of questioning for question’s sake. We can ignore such objections for practical purposes.

I also want to present another axiom for acceptance: “Life and happiness of each individual have equal value”.

This is the equivalent of Bentham’s maxim: “Each one to count for one and none for more than one”.

We must have this as an axiom if we want to formulate ethical rules, which will be acceptable to most or all humans as rational beings. Why will anyone voluntarily accept moral rules, which do not give equal value to his or her life and happiness as others?

Sometimes, utilitarianism is represented as having the “attractive slogan” of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” but this formulation is, to my mind, a little dangerous, because it seems to be implying that the happiness of a small number could be sacrificed for the sake of a larger number. The utilitarian principle, I think, should be formulated as “maximum happiness for all” with each individual being given equal value. Moreover, because it is the individual who can best know and decide what will give him happiness, in the social context, the formula should be “maximum freedom for all”. Every individual must have maximum freedom to live his life in his own way unless he or she transgresses on the similar freedom of others. The aim of a rational ethics should be to maximize freedom and avenues of happiness and to minimize avoidable suffering. Life, happiness, liberty and equality are, according to me, some basic human values. There are other values, which can be added and can be shown as means to these basic values, namely, knowledge and fraternity. Knowledge can be shown a means to human happiness and logical-scientific thinking can be shown a means to knowledge. Similarly, fraternity can be shown a means to maximizing freedom and happiness.

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