8. Narsingh Narain
Narsingh Narain (1897-1972) was the founder of Indian Humanist Union (IHU), an organisation for promoting humanism. He is an important humanist thinker of twentieth century India, and his ideas deserve to be known better.
Biography
Narsingh Narain was born on October 4, 1897 at Mirzapur in Uttar Pradesh. After completing his school education, he started working as a teacher. However, he continued his studies and took his B.A. degree from Allahabad University.
In 1923, Narsingh Narain appeared for the first competitive examination for the U.P. Civil Service, and secured first position in it. He remained in government service from 1923 to 1954 by which time he had been absorbed in the Indian Administrative Service.
In 1954, Narsingh Narain sought premature retirement from government service in order to work for promotion of free thought, and a scientific and tolerant attitude to life and religion. He had cherished these ideals since his younger days when he had rebelled against traditional religious beliefs. In 1954 itself Narsingh Narain founded the Society for the Promotion of Freedom of Thought at Allahabad. This organisation was the forerunner of the Indian Humanist Union, founded by him in 1960 at Naini Tal, where he had settled down after retirement. He travelled widely from Naini Tal to organise social work, seminars, national integration forums, etc. The Indian Humanist Union was affiliated with the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU).
In 1966, Narsingh Narain started a quarterly journal, Humanist Outlook, for promoting ethical values, social reform, communal harmony and rational outlook on life. He established Humanist Endowment Fund Society (HEFS) in 1970 to provide financial support to humanist activities.
Narsingh Narain wrote extensively in Indian and foreign journals, promoting humanist ideas and values. He attended the world congresses of the IHEU held in London (1957), Oslo (1962) and Boston (1970), making valuable contributions to the deliberations on social and philosophical problems. He led a very active life right till the end, editing the Humanist Outlook, lecturing and touring in India and abroad, and organising meetings and seminars for the Indian Humanist Union. On his death on August 31, 1972, he bequeathed all his life’s savings to the Humanist Endowment Fund Society.
Publications
Narsingh Narain wrote more than a hundred essays on humanist subjects, which were published in the Humanist Outlook and other journals. A special number of Humanist Outlook published in August 1968 contains valuable material on Narsingh Narain’s ideas.
In 1996, a small book titled A Commonsense Humanism and Other Essays was jointly published by the Indian Humanist Union and the Indian Secular Society. This book, edited by A. Solomon of the Indian Secular Society, contains nine selected essays of Narsingh Narain, including “A Common-Sense Humanism”, “Is Humanism a Religion?”, “Morality and Moral Education” and “Religion and Philosophy in India”. Narsingh Narain's son Prakash Narain of the Indian Humanist Union and A. Solomon have jointly written the foreword of the book. The essays contained in the book “include Narsingh Narain’s ideas on some of the more fundamental issues involved in the concept of humanism and connected subjects.”
A Common-Sense Humanism
The essay "A Common Sense Humanism" was written by Narsingh Narain in 1960 as an explanatory note on the Memorandum of Association of the Indian Humanist Union. According to Narsingh Narain, dissenters from the traditional religions have differed both in the nature of the dissent and in their positive beliefs and attitudes. They have used various labels to indicate their viewpoint, namely, “freethought”, “secularism”, “ethical culture or ethical religion”, “rationalism” and “humanism”. Since the formation of the International Humanist and Ethical Union in 1952, says Narain in his essay, there has been a growing tendency to use “humanism” as a general term for all those viewpoint which are represented in that Union. Narsingh Narain has mentioned very clearly that he has used the word “humanism” in his essay in the sense used by the IHEU.
The diversity among the views among humanists, says Narsingh Narain, has led to the adoption of another set of labels. Humanism has been described as “scientific”, “naturalistic”, “religious”, “radical”, “ethical” and “evolutionary”. Narsingh Narain has used the label of “Common-sense Humanism” for describing his own viewpoint. As he says:
Whenever it may be necessary for us to wear a distinctive badge, we will call our viewpoint ‘Common-sense Humanism’. We wish to emphasise that Humanism is not meant for an intellectual elite but for everyone, and that we rely more on common sense than on science or philosophy.
Humanism needs no metaphysical basis
Narsingh Narain has referred to the views of American philosopher Corliss Lamont as expressed in his book The Philosophy of Humanism:
Humanism believes in a naturalistic metaphysics or attitude toward the universe that considers all forms of the supernatural as myth; that regards Nature as the totality of being and as a constantly changing system of matter and energy which exists independently of any mind or consciousness.
He also refers to M.N.Roy’s views:
A humanist ethics, based upon a naturalist rationalism, can be built only on the rock-bottom of a mechanistic cosmology and a physical-realist ontology.
However, Narsingh Narain himself does not regard either “naturalistic metaphysics” or any other brand of metaphysics as essential to humanism. As he says:
We are not concerned, as Humanists, with metaphysical theories as such but only with their bearing, if any, on our practical aims. And we believe that as long as our judgement is not fettered by the acceptance of the authority of religious scriptures, and our aims are this-worldly, it makes no difference whether our philosophical preference lies towards naturalism or idealism.
Narsingh Narain admits that scientific temper in the sense of loyalty to fact and readiness to revise opinions is one of the basic values of humanism. In fact, he regards “the rejection of the doctrine of finality, and the extension of the scientific approach to religious problems” as “the most revolutionary aspect of Humanism”. But, according to him, the basis of morality is instinctive and emotional. It is rooted in the sentiment of love and friendship, which not only the unsophisticated human being but even the higher animals share with us. The essence of morality is the extension of love and sympathy beyond the family and towards a fellowship with all humankind. The problem about moral ideals is not that they are difficult to understand – this requires only common sense and sympathy – but that they are difficult to live out in practice. It has always been a human weakness to drift into avenues of escape from the often-arduous demand of moral ideals, and philosophical and theological debates have provided one such avenue. In religious circles there is an endless string of commentaries on the sacred text, and discourses which are supposed to bring out their hidden meanings attract large audiences. Common sense and sympathy are thus clouded by intellectual sophistication. Narsingh Narain is of the view that this is the danger to which humanists are equally exposed. According to him, “there are many things which can distract our attention from constructive moral effort, which is our main object. Combating the traditional religions is one.”
Narain maintains that if humanists come into conflict with the traditional religions it will be only because they are concerned with moral and social problem, and some harmful customs and social barriers enjoy the sanction or connivance of those religions. But, by and large what they have to contend against is not hostility but apathy, which is found in believers and dissenters alike:
If our primary concern is not what we believe but how we live, we must recognise that persons and groups with widely different beliefs, whether within or outside the traditional religions, can live equally admirable (or unadmirable) lives. We should, therefore, seek opportunities for co-operation and try to avoid occasions for conflict. We should be prepared to learn from the examples and insights of all ethically great people in all parts of the world and in all periods of history. On the other hand, the fact of a man’s ethical greatness is no recommendation for the acceptance of his beliefs, which should be considered on their merits and rejected unhesitatingly if they do not appeal to us.
God, Atheism, Agnosticism and Humanism
Many humanists, says Narsingh Narain, seem to think that “rejection of God is the first necessity for rational living.” But, according to Narain, “this is as untenable as the opposite view, which is constantly dinned into our ears from other quarters, that atheism must lead to moral decay.”
Narsingh Narain maintains that belief in god, by itself, is not harmful. It is some further beliefs, usually associated with it, which are harmful. These beliefs have a bearing on our ideas of right and wrong. These are (1) that the will of god is revealed in this or that sacred book or through this or that prophet or incarnation and (2) linking morality with the idea of reward and punishment in another world or another life. Narsingh Narain is of the view that “where beliefs or speculation about God are not associated with further beliefs of this kind, there is no reason to make their rejection part of our common ground.” (Emphasis added) The theism of men like Albert Einstein, Arthur Keith and A.N.Whitehead is just as acceptable as the atheism of men like Julian Huxley, Corliss Lamont and M.N.Roy. Agnostics, too, ought to be equally welcome.
Narain has referred to Huxley’s observation that the “God” which men like Whitehead “claim to reveal – has no relation, so far as can be observed, with the various gods or aspects of God which humanity in its thousands of millions has actually worshipped” and that “it would be much better to call it by another name.”
Narain admits that there is force in this criticism, but, according to him, this raises a general problem, which is not confined to the use of word “God”, and has defied solution so far. The coining of new words everywhere lags much behind the development of new ideas and the same word has to express several, sometimes quite dissimilar ideas. According to Narain, it does not seem that such disputes will be resolved by introducing a new word "but only by agreeing, or not agreeing, to assign a new meaning to an old word."
Narsingh Narain has also referred to the view that “the existence of God must make a difference and so we cannot be non-committal on the issue.” He admits that the existence of God must make a difference. According to him, the existence of God makes a difference to what we are. But the question is whether this need make any difference to what we have to do. The answer to that, says Narain, would depend upon one’s conception of God:
Independent theism does not have to imagine God in the likeness of an old-fashioned despot whose favours have to be sought by praises and offerings. The traditional religions, with all their subsequent refinements, have not been able to shake off this feature of God-belief completely. But a man who accepts Whitehead’s God or Einstein’s God can still agree with the Cambridge Humanists that “human problems can and must be faced in terms of human intellectual and moral resources, without invoking supernatural authority.”
Thus, says Narain, there is no difference that matters between atheism and some forms of theism. “It would appear that the word God rather than what it signifies excites two opposite attitudes – a case of what has been called ‘signal reaction’. Some people love the word God, irrespective of its meaning, and even if it means nothing at all. Others have an equal aversion for it, no matter what it means.”
Life after Death
According to Narsingh Narain, from the point of view of humanism, the question of life after death can be dealt with on the basis of common sense alone. Even if it is assumed that psychical research has established human survival, says Narain, it does not follow that we should therefor make the life hereafter the pivot of our efforts in this life. We may well say that we can confine our attention to the welfare and progress of ourselves in this life, and those who are to come after us, and leave the future life to take care of itself. But even if we think that it would be prudent to do something about the future life, the next question would then arise: what are we to do about it? There is no evidence of any kind to tell us what we could do, and, says Narain, we do not accept the authority of any scriptures. So we can only guess. We cannot substitute for the certainties provided by revelations another set of certainties derived from human knowledge. And common sense, maintains Narain, should tell us that the religious accounts of what happens after death are also guesses or rationalisations. For one group of religions teaches that we are reborn in this very world, while another group teaches that we pass on to another world and both claim infallible authority for their respective doctrines. If there is indeed a future life, the only thing we could take with us, it would seem, is our character, which is formed by self-discipline and moral striving. But these are, according to Narain, valuable in any case.
Thus, concludes Narain, there is no need for us, as humanists, to consider the evidence for and against human survival. For whether we survive or not makes no difference to our practical ideals. Moreover, a craving for future life is unhealthy, if only for the simple reason that our wishes can make no difference to whatever the fact may happen to be. Belief in future life was not based on evidence. It was an expression of faith arising out of a certain mental background. The important thing, according to Narain, is to outgrow that mental outlook, not to disprove survival, or to rule out faith altogether. Once the mental attitude is changed the fact of survival or non-survival becomes immaterial.
Is Humanism a Religion?
“Is Humanism a Religion?” is the second essay in Narsingh Narain’s collection of essays. Narain’s article “Humanists Viewpoints: A Critical Study” published in the August 98 special number of Humanist Outlook, too, contains his views on the meaning and the function of religion as well as on the question of calling humanism a religion.
According to Narain, “a rather vehement debate” broke out in the columns of the American Humanist in 1962 following the publication of an article by Julian Huxley titled “The Coming New Religion of Humanism”. The debate lasted the whole year. Narsingh Narain also took part in the debate.
In his “Is Humanism a Religion?” Narsingh Narain once again clarifies that he is using the word “humanism” as “a general term for all those viewpoints, which are represented in the International Humanist and Ethical Union”. Narsingh Narain has used the word "non-believer" for “all those who do not believe in any of the traditional religions”. According to him, Marxists, freethinkers, ethical culturists, rationalists, agnostics and humanists are non-believers. Narain points out that non-believers differ widely on the role of religion in human life.
The Communists, for example, maintain that “religions have never served any useful purpose and have merely been strongholds of ignorance and superstition, instruments of exploitation and enemies of social justice.” More or less similar views are held by other sections of non-believers, specially those known as freethinkers. On the other hand, there are non-believers who hold that religion, “despite the evils associated with it, has satisfied some real human need.” Similarly, while some sections of non-believers are strongly opposed to the application of the term “religion” to their own beliefs. Some others use the term “religion” for their views.
The Meaning of Religion
According to Narain, the diversity of views among humanists on calling humanism a religion is to a large extent owing to different ideas on origin, nature and function of religion among humanists. As he says:
If Humanism is to be an alternative to the traditional religions (whether it is itself to be called a religion or not), we must try to be clear in our minds about the meaning and function of religion, and on this matter there is a great diversity of views, not only between believers and non-believers, but among both believers and non-believers themselves..
In the second section of his article “Humanists Viewpoints: A Critical Study”, titled “The Meaning of Religion”, Narain points out that The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives seven meanings of the word “religion”. Out of these he has quoted the following three definitions, which, according to him, are relevant to the discussion:
1. Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire to please a divine ruling power; the exercise or practice of rites implying this.
2. A particular system of faith and worship.
3. Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence and worship.
Narain asserts that humanism cannot be a religion according to these definitions.
The Function of Religion
Dictionaries, however, says Narain, have not attempted functional definitions of religion. The dictionary definitions mentioned earlier are all in terms of beliefs, attitudes and actions and make no reference to the function or functions, which the religions have performed, or claimed to perform. Those who wish to call humanism a religion, points out Narain, maintain that “the religions have served useful and necessary functions in human life, and that Humanism too can and should perform those functions.”
Narain’s own view of the function of religion has been summarised in the first paragraph of his essay “The Problem of Pessimism”, which is the third essay in his collection of essays. In words of Narsingh Narain:
Religion came into existence in response to a problem, which was a by-product of man’s development as thinking, self-conscious animal. With this mental development came the realisation that human life was short and precarious, threatened by all kinds of dangers, and surrounded by blind forces hostile or indifferent to him, over which man had no control. Our ancestors solved the problem of pessimism (in so far as they did solve it) by convincing themselves about a future life guaranteed by the existence of a merciful and all-powerful God.
In an important footnote to the essay “The Problem of Pessimism”, Narain says:
If we define religion (as I think we should) in terms of the function it has tried to serve, that is, of helping the individual to feel at home in an apparently hostile universe, and not in terms of its beliefs and doctrines, such as supernaturalism, then we are perfectly justified in speaking of a Humanistic religion.
More or less similar ideas about the function of religion has been expressed by Narsingh Narain in “Is Humanism a Religion?”. Belief in gods who could be appeased by prayers and sacrificial bribes, though a delusion, according to Narain, “produced an unintended result by restoring that optimism which is natural to life but had suffered disturbance as a by-effect of man’s mental evolution.”
Referring to Bertrand Russell’s view that religion is “a disease born of fear”, Narain says that it is not correct to call religion a disease because it consisted of mythical beliefs. According to Narain, “religion, at any rate in its origin, was not a disease but a remedy.” We tend to be impatient with the defence of myths, says Narain, but it would be difficult to get rid of myths unless there is an appreciation of why they came to be accepted in the first place. In words of Narain:
Given fear and insecurity most people will still readily accept myths, though the myths may be secular. For hope, not as an articulate belief but as a state of mind, is not only natural but necessary to life. Pessimism can only be endured up to a point and for a time, and when the limits are exceeded, neurosis results...A myth which relieves a neurosis is as much a remedy as a true belief. This of course, does not mean that we should continue to cling to myths.
The Religion of Wholeness
Narsingh Narain, in “Is Humanism a Religion?” rejects belief in personal immortality and expounds what he calls “the religion of wholeness”:
In accepting death as the end of my existence as an individual, I have no feeling of merely reconciling myself to what is inevitable, for I do not believe that personal immortality would be a good thing, if it were true…I believe that all things that exist are in some way connected with one another and form a whole. I am part of that whole, in intimate connection with the rest. My individuality, which I value so much, has come out of the whole and at every moment depends on it. It is only a temporary phase in the march of life. The desire for the indefinite continuation of this individuality is one which we have to outgrow, as a child outgrows his fondness for toys.
Thus, according to Narsingh Narain, the doctrine of immortality of souls as a remedy for human pessimism, not being based on reality, was bound to break down sooner or later. The real remedy for pessimism lies in a more active identification of an individual with the life around him. The individual thereby shares a larger life and becomes more truly himself.
Narain maintains that these views can appropriately be called religious because (1) they serve exactly the same purpose as the religions have done or attempted to do, and (2) there is a link between them and even the crude supernaturalism of the primitive man.
The common element between the primitive polytheism, the various forms of monotheism and pantheism and the non-theism and atheism of Buddhism and Jainism, can be expressed, according to Narain, by the word: trust (in the universe). Primitive man acquired this trust in the only way open to him. Taking advantage of the subsequent human experiences and insights, we can have this trust without imagining the existence of an anthropomorphic deity.
The ideas mentioned above, says Narain, may be called a philosophy of wholeness but that would not convey their emotional tone. An intellectual apprehension of wholeness is philosophy, but when charged with emotion it becomes religion. Therefore, says Narain, “perhaps we can call it the religion of wholeness.” Stress on science, democracy and the rejection of authority and dogma, found in organised humanism, is all very good and necessary, according to Narain. But it misses the historic role of religion. The nearest approach to “religion proper”, he maintains, is the stress on ethics, for it is only through ethical living that one can escape from the prison of selfhood. Julian Huxley’s description of humanism, concludes Narain, as the “coming” new religion seems therefore to be very appropriate.
Morality and Moral Education
Morality, according to Narsingh Narain, is the primary concern of humanism and one of the most important subjects that a humanist has to deal with. In his “A Common-sense Humanism”, he clearly mentions that humanism for him means “reliance upon human capacities and human appreciation of values, as opposed to the dictates of alleged Divine revelation.”
In “Morality and Moral Education”, Narsingh Narain says that the essence of morality may be described as “consideration for others”. This consideration for others is partly inherent in the individual and partly or largely it is produced by the influence of the environment. Every child is born into a society or community in which he finds that certain things are approved and certain things are disapproved; and he tries to shape his behaviour according to the modes prevalent in that society. This external factor which ensures good behaviour towards others because of the hope of the approval or fear of the disapproval of the community is, according to Narain, not the whole of morality. Moral action is one, which is done without hope of reward or fear of punishment from outside. In words of Narain:
Moral behaviour is that of which the sanction is on my own heart or in my own mind. I would go so far as to say that, any action which is done from the fear of external consequences or the hope of external approval is not morality in the true sense.
Narain has made a distinction between “law-abidingness” and “true morality”. The good behaviour, which is prompted by hope or fear of consequences, is law-abidingness. On the other hand, the good behaviour, which is done in order to please oneself, is true morality.
According to Narain, true morality has been distorted from the very beginning owing to the influence of religion:
Through the ages, because of the introduction of the fear element, and the concept of the fear of God introduced in religion, there was a setback to the moral progress of humanity. This is one of the influences of religions, which we have to counteract…
According to Narain, morality cannot be properly linked with the ideas of reward and punishment either in this world or any other. Some temporary advantage may be gained by doing so, but in the long run it must tend to undermine true morality. While external sanctions are necessary for the preservation of social order, “moral values are intrinsically compelling, and independent of hope of reward and fear of punishment”. Morality, maintains Narain, is older than the ideas of God and a future life. Morality “is rooted in the sentiment of love and friendship which not only the unsophisticated human being but even the high animals share with us”. Belief in a future life had existed for a long time before it began to be used as a prop for good social behaviour, and the connection between the two has been exaggerated. There are today, points out Narain, millions of people who have no faith in future life and there is no evidence to show that they are less moral or more prone to crime than those who have such faith.
Narain has referred to the question whether morality is based on reason or emotion or on something else or whether it is purely a product of biological and psychosocial environment. According to him, humanist should enter into this question “only insofar as it has implications for the practical work which we have to do in advancing morality.” The only point on which humanist have often disagreed, according to Narain, is the role of reason. It is sometimes said man is moral because he is rational, or rationality is the basis of morality. On the other hand, others have said that morality is the matter of feeling or of likes and dislikes, and reason only tells us what means we should adopt to advance what we consider to be morality. According to Narain, before going very deep into the question of rightness of such differences, one must consider the implications of the two versions, whether one version would lead to a course of action which would be different from the other.
In his essay “Morality and Moral Education” Narain has also expressed his views on moral education. According to him, moral education must start from childhood, and as far as the moral education of the child is concerned, it is not possible to avoid conditioning. Whether we wish it or not, a child will be conditioned: and the only thing we can decide is in what way we want to condition him. Narain admits that humanists are opposed to all kind of interfering with the freedom of the child. Humanists want the child to form his own ideas and judgement about things when he grows up. But, according to Narain, this does not apply to his behaviour towards his fellows, and unless we instil in the mind of the child a consideration for others, later on it may not come up at all. The humanists can do this with a clear conscience. As he says:
As a humanist I would not like to indoctrinate my child with my own views about God, soul and spirit and future life and Marxism and Socialism and so on. I would leave all that for him to decide for himself when he grows up. But I would like to condition my child in such a way that he develops a sense of fellow feelings, that he has consideration for others and whatever considerations for others he has is increased, is developed … it seems to me that we shall never be able to catch up with the evil influences which the religions have spread in regard to morality unless we take hold of the child in his early years and implant in his mind love for his fellow-beings, a spirit of sympathy and understanding and helpfulness and so on.
Narain says that his idea of conditioning the child should not be objected to on the ground that reason is the source of morality. According to him, humanists and freethinkers had to emphasize the role of reason because the first thing for them was to emancipate their minds from the authority of tradition and scriptures. But, maintains Narain, when reason is held to be supreme, it should be defined in such a manner that other equally important faculties and perceptions of the human mind such as the appreciation of beauty and the feeling of love are not put at a disadvantage.
Narain asserts that humanism should be more concerned with moral progress than with almost anything else. Broadly speaking, says Narain, we need two kinds of things. Firstly, we need better social structures and better institutions; and secondly, we need better individuals who will man these institutions. Both these are absolutely important. According to Narain, the importance of the individual and his education has not been given the attention it deserves. Humanists should be concerned as much with school and university education as with politics, democracy and constitutional reforms.
Religion and Philosophy in India
"Religion and Philosophy in India" was presented as a paper by Narsingh Narain at the 31st session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Annamalainagar in December, 1956. It was also published in the organ of the Congress, the Philosophical Quarterly (June 1957) under the title “Does Indian Philosophy Need Orientation?”
Narain begins his paper by referring to the following observation by D.M.Datta regarding Radhakrishnan: “Metaphysics is to him, as to the ancient Indian philosophers, only a rational preparation for the solution of life’s problems.”
This practical bias of Indian philosophy, says Narain, is claimed to be its main distinguishing feature. In the West, we are told, philosophy is merely an intellectual pursuit, having no necessary moral or spiritual implications. In India the philosophical quest is the means to the attainment of highest spiritual aims. We are further told that Indian thinkers emphasise the need for physical, mental and moral discipline on which both the vision of philosophical truth and the achievements of spiritual poise and progress depend. Because of this, the different traditional schools of Indian philosophy also acted as the foundations of different religious sects - they constituted the religions of the intellectual elite. Philosophy, in India, arose out of religion and never detached itself from it.
To the above general statement, says Narain, two exceptions must be made. The Charvaka materialism, with its rejection of future life and the ideal of salvation, is a philosophy without religion. Buddhism, on the other hand, according to Narain, is a religion without philosophy.
Be as it may, Narain points out that even in the West the growth of philosophy as an independent study, unhampered by religious needs and considerations, is a recent thing. Thus the mixing of religion and philosophy is not altogether a peculiarly Indian problem. The question is, according to Narain, whether such fusion is satisfactory. Narain raises the question whether the sort of union that generally exists between religion and philosophy in the Indian schools of thought is sound and feasible.
According to Narain, the approach to philosophy, unlike in religion, is not through faith, but, as in science, through free inquiry born out of curiosity. The subject matters of science and philosophy may be different in nature, requiring different techniques for studying them, but there is a great deal more in common between philosophy and science than between philosophy and religion. Referring to the claims regarding the intuition of the saints, Narain says:
Logic and intuition are both good instruments for unravelling the mysteries of existence, but mankind, both in the East and in the West, came to place an excessive reliance on them, thus retarding the progress of both science and philosophy. Whether we proceed by reasoning or by intuition we come up against brute facts which disturb our neat theories.
Religious initiation everywhere, points out Narain, starts with the assumption that one or more persons have reached the vision of the highest truth beyond which there is nothing left to be known or realised. All we have to do is to follow the path shown by them. That is the first article of faith to which the aspirants are expected to subscribe. The metaphysical propositions placed before them are not merely the results of reasoning applied to the experiences of life, but the utterances of prophets or saints who have had direct perception of the highest truth. If you have doubts about these, logic will not help you - sit down and meditate until conviction is achieved. Since there is no question of independent verification, everyone eventually becomes convinced of the metaphysical tenets of his own particular sect. Such regimentation of thought, says Narain, even if salutary in intent when associated with religion, should be entirely foreign to the spirit of philosophy. It frowns upon doubt and disbelief, and in the religious tradition everywhere unbelievers are threatened with dire punishment. In the context of Indian philosophy, Narain quotes the following words from Gita:
But the man who is ignorant, who is of a doubting nature, perishes. For the doubting soul, there is neither this world nor the world beyond nor any happiness.
Narain refers to Radhakrishnan’s view that, “faith (sraddha) is not blind belief. It is the aspiration of the soul to gain wisdom. It is the reflection in the empirical self of the wisdom that dwells in the deepest levels of our being.”
But, points out Narain, this is not the sense in which the word sraddha is used in religious discourses and elsewhere. In the Vivek Chudamani, for instance, Shankar says that sraddha consists in accepting the words of the shastras and the guru as true.
Whatever one may think of these explanations, says Narain, it is obvious that the approach by faith is not the right approach in philosophy. When philosophy and religion are lumped together, whether in India and elsewhere, the former tends to become sacrosanct like divine revelation and to degenerate into barren exercise in interpretation of texts. It loses its freshness and strength and lives too much in past.
We in India, maintains Narain, have been concerned too much with proving to ourselves and the outside world (what is quite true) that the intellectual quality, the breadth of vision and the flights of speculation displayed by our ancestors can compare favourably with anything to be found in the rest of the world. In a country awakening after a long night of political subjection and intellectual stagnation, says Narain, such self-assertion is natural and necessary, but it can be overdone, and continued for too long.
Narain also refer to the view that Indian thinkers because of their intimate acquaintance with both Indian and Western philosophy are in a special position to evolve a synthetic world-view, combining and taking into account the best features of both. But, according to Narain, this role can only be fulfilled if philosophy becomes an independent pursuit, unfettered by any practical considerations and unhampered by any feelings of loyalty to ancient thought, however great. Anything in the nature of a regional patriotism should be quite out of place for philosophy, as for science. According to Narain, the bulk of contemporary (twentieth century) philosophy, where it is philosophy proper and not simply a handmaiden of religion, is concerned with history and interpretation. The rest is mostly occupied with the pleasant task of reconciling divergent ways of thought which, it is claimed, is calculated to advance the spiritual solidarity of mankind. There is, however, a careful avoidance of anything, which may be construed as a criticism of deeply cherished religious beliefs. The desire not to hurt the feelings of others, says Narain, is no doubt most admirable, but unfortunately philosophy cannot afford to be other than completely frank without stultifying itself.
The Humanism of Jawaharlal Nehru
In his essays “The Religion of Mahatma Gandhi” and “The Humanism of Jawaharlal Nehru”, Narsingh Narain has expressed his views on the religious ideas of Gandhi and Nehru. While admiring the ethical greatness of Gandhi, Narain describes his exposition of religious beliefs as “untenable and retrograde” though “in no way dogmatic or fanatical”. Among other things, Narain criticises Gandhi for using the word “God” in an arbitrary manner, and for describing Charles Bradlaugh as “a God-fearing man”. (Charles Bradlaugh was the founder of the National Secular Society, London, and a self-declared atheist.) On the other hand, Narain has expressed his agreement with Nehru’s views on God.
In “The Humanism of Jawaharlal Nehru” Narain says that Nehru was recognised all over the world as one of the greatest humanist of twentieth century. This, according to him, does not mean that humanists agreed with all his views and policies, whether political or non-political. When Nehru came on the political scene, says Narain, a certain attitude towards Indian spirituality had firmly entrenched itself as a major element in the patriot’s repertoire. It was assumed that so far as the deeper problems of human life and destiny are concerned, Indian thought at its best already contained the perennial truth, which needed no addition or revision and was only waiting to be rediscovered. Nehru did not deny that there were good points in India’s past heritage but he did not share the prevailing admiration for India’s spirituality. In his Autobiography he wrote:
It is a commonplace that in the modern industrial West outward development has outstripped the inner, but it does not follow, as many people in the East appear to imagine, that because we are industrially backward and our external development has been slow, therefore, our inner evolution has been greater. That is one of the delusions with which we try to comfort ourselves and to overcome our feeling of inferiority.
Nehru, according to Narain, though not an uncritical admirer of the Western civilisation, was a whole-hearted votary of Western science and the scientific approach. Science, according to Nehru, had its role to play in all spheres of life and thought. As he said:
Let us therefore not rule out intuition and other methods of sensing truth and reality. They are necessary even for the purpose of science. But always we must hold to our anchor of precise objective knowledge tested by reason and even more so by experiment and practice, and always we must beware of losing ourselves in a sea of speculation unconnected with the day-to-day problems of life and the needs of men and women.
Narsingh Narain has quoted the following passage to describe Nehru’s view on the question of God:
What the mysterious is I do not know. I do not call it God because God has come to mean much that I do not believe in. I find myself incapable of thinking of a deity or of any unknown supreme power in anthropomorphic terms, and the fact that many people think so is continually a source of surprise to me. Any idea of a personal God seems odd to me.
Nehru, according to Narain, was explicit about his disbelief in religion as it stands; though he acknowledged that religion had satisfied some deeply felt need of human nature. According to Nehru:
Religion as I saw it practised, and accepted even by thinking minds, whether it was Hinduism or Islam or Christianity did not attract me. It seemed to be closely associated with superstitious practices and dogmatic beliefs.
According to Narain, we find in Nehru “a rare combination of healthy scepticism and sympathetic appreciation. He was a man who even in the face of great personal grief and tragedy, never sought the security of comforting beliefs which in his view would not stand the test of free inquiry.”
Narain concludes by saying that Nehru’s humanism did not quite conform to the type generally prevalent, at least in the English speaking countries, that is, naturalism. His view resembled those of T.H.Huxley and Gilbert Murray and can perhaps be best described as agnosticism. Nehru’s humanism did not entail a clear rejection of supernaturalism, which occupies the central position in the dictionary definitions of “humanism”. Nehru only rejected the concept of an anthropomorphic God. He neither affirmed nor denied the existence of other kinds of god and apparently regarded the question as of no practical importance.